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Notes
The TRIMs Agreement: A Failed Attempt
at Investment Liberalization
Paul Civello
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures1
(TRIMs Agreement or Agreement) which emerged from the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations2 was the product
of a long and contentious negotiating history.3 Yet the result
may not have been worth the pains. Indeed, despite the sound of
the developed nations' clamor for investment liberalization and
the fury of the developing nations' opposition to it, this Agree-
ment may ultimately signify nothing. Two recent controversies
involving foreign direct investment4 (FDI) in the automobile in-
dustries of Brazil and Indonesia 5 have exposed the inadequacies
of the TRIMs Agreement, highlighting the need for more effec-
tive protections against host country 6 restraints on FDI.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TExTs, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs].
2. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
3. See generally THE GArr URUGUAY RouND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1995) (discussing at length the negotia-
tions that led to the TRIMs Agreement).
4. Foreign direct investment involves foreign ownership and control-e.g.,
when a manufacturer operates a facility in a foreign country. It is different from
"passive," or "portfolio," investment in which a foreign investor may own equity
in a company, but exercises no control over it. See Jeffery Atik, Fairness and
Managed Foreign Direct Investment, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 n.1 (1994).
5. See John Parry & Ed Taylor, TRIMs: United States Accuses Indonesia,
Brazil of Violating TRIMS Obligations, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 18, 1997),
available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database; Mark Felsenthal, U.S. Launches
Section 301 Investigations Against 4 Nations Regarding Cars, Textiles, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 3, 1996), available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database.
6. Discussions of foreign direct investment distinguish between the "host
country" and the "home country." The former is the country in which the invest-
ment is made; the latter is the country from which the investment is controlled.
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The reason for the TRIMs Agreement's failure is simple: it
does nothing new. Although intended to bring trade-related in-
vestment measures (TRIMs) within the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade7 (GATT), the Agreement merely reiterates
what was already in GATT, providing no new protections or
remedies for foreign investors. Moreover, the Agreement con-
tains no plan or procedural framework for moving toward in-
vestment liberalization and shies away from innovation or
experimentation. Hardly a "GATT for Investment"8 as some had
hoped, 9 the TRIMs Agreement is at best a transitional arrange-
ment that may serve, at least, as a sign that future trade negoti-
ations will have to address FDI. Other FDI regimes and
proposals, however, offer more hope for global investment
liberalization.
This Note will examine the TRIMs Agreement and its inef-
fectiveness in moving toward investment liberalization. Part I
will outline justifications for and arguments against trade-re-
lated investment measures, review the negotiating history of the
TRIMs Agreement, and analyze its main features. Part II will
focus on the recent controversies over the national car programs
of Brazil and Indonesia, demonstrating that the Agreement fails
to prevent or remedy the TRIMs these programs impose. Part III
will look at one alternative arrangement that shows greater
promise in bringing about global investment liberalization: the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's pro-
posed Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
For example, in the case of the General Motors facilities in Brazil, discussed
infra Part II.B., Brazil is the host country and the United States is the home
country. See Atik, supra note 4, at 2 n.1.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT 1947 was incorpo-
rated into the 1994 World Trade Organization Agreement. See Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 405.
8. See generally Paul M. Goldberg & Charles P. Kindleberger, Toward a
GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corpora-
tion, 2 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 295 (1970) (proposing a GATT-like treaty for
FDI).
9. See Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay
Round: An Unfinished Business?, presented at The Uruguay Round and the De-
veloping Economies, A World Bank Conference, Jan. 26-27, 1995, at 5. The
United States, which proposed the original negotiating agenda for the TRIMs
Agreement, had hoped for such a "GATT for investment." Id.
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I. HISTORY OF TRIMs AND THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
A. THEORY OF TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES
No provision in GATT prohibits governments from regulat-
ing foreign direct investment. 10 Regulations on investment,
however, often have trade-distorting effects. By restricting FDI
or providing incentives to foreign corporations to invest, govern-
ments of host countries can affect trade flows or competitive re-
lationships.'1 Such regulations, or TRIMs, take many forms:
local content requirements mandating the use of domestically
produced products, local equity requirements affecting owner-
ship, foreign exchange restrictions, and export or "trade-balanc-
ing" requirements. 12
Historically, TRIMs have been employed primarily by devel-
oping countries, particularly those with abundant natural re-
sources and large labor pools, as a means of extracting
concessions from foreign-owned multinational corporations that
want to open and operate subsidiaries within their territories.13
Local content requirements, for example, can force multination-
als to use domestically-produced raw materials and inputs,
thereby promoting and protecting domestic industry. Developing
host countries have also used TRIMs, in the form of incentives,
to enhance regional development, industialization, export ex-
pansion, and technology transfer.' 4
The multinationals, based largely in the United States, Eu-
rope, and Japan, have historically opposed TRIMs, for these cor-
porations would like to reap the benefits of direct investment in
developing nations without being subjected to countervailing
10. See Atik, supra note 4, at 1, 6.
11. See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Trade-Related Investment
Measures, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RESULTS-ORIENTED AP-
PROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 147, 147 (Jeffrey J. Schott
ed.,1990).
12. See Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, The United
States-Latin American Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 127
(1995). Other TRIMs include export performance requirements, foreign ex-
change balancing requirements, domestic sales requirements, manufacturing
requirements, manufacturing limitations, technology transfer requirements, re-
mittance restrictions, licensing requirements, and product mandating require-
ments. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 4.
13. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 3. See also Graham & Krug-
man, supra note 11, at 149 (discussing TRIMs as a means of extracting surplus
from multinationals).
14. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 7.
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charges or restrictions.' 5 They desire access to the raw materi-
als often found in developing nations, as well as the low cost pro-
duction that such access and a large labor pool assure.16 The
multinationals may also want market access: FDI can be a
means of "tariff-jumping," a way of entering a market without
having to surmount a tariff barrier.'7
Yet the arguments on both sides of the TRIMs debate are
grounded in deeper soil than short-term self-interest-namely,
in competing economic theories and politics. The classic theoreti-
cal dichotomy between protectionism and free trade is broad
enough to encompass TRIMs, for TRIMS are, in effect, protec-
tionism applied to direct investment.' 8 Developing nations have
embraced protectionism because they see it as necessary to
counterbalance the economic power of the large multinational
corporations. 19 Both TRIMs and multinationals are inherently
trade-distorting, the protectionist argument holds, and therefore
the developing host countries must use the former to neutralize
the power of the latter.20
The multinationals and their developed home countries
have advanced the opposing free trade argument that trade bar-
riers, however localized, hurt everyone economically. 21 Trade
barriers, including TRIMs, are ultimately "welfare deteriorat-
ing," even for those nations erecting them.22 Despite the short-
term benefits outlined above, host nations limit their own
growth and development by restricting or distorting FDI. More-
over, free trade advocates contend, if all nations were to impose
protectionist policies the world economy would suffer. As has
15. Needless to say, the home countries of the multinationals support their
corporations' opposition to TRIMs. The United States, the largest home country
of multinational corporations, has been the primary opponent of TRIMs over
the years. See Graham & Krugman, supra note 11, at 147.
16. See Djisman Simandjuntak, Scope of the Trading System: Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, presented at Uruguay Round Agreements
from an Asia-Pacific Perspective, George Washington University, Aug. 1-3,
1994, at 9.
17. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 13; see also Atik, supra note
4, at 2 (noting that FDI can provide a mechanism to thwart trade protectionism
and provide alternate means of access to host country markets).
18. See Graham & Krugman, supra note 11, at 148. "TRIMs may be viewed
as back-door mercantilist policies that evade existing disciplines on such poli-
cies." Id.
19. See id. at 148-49.
20. See id.
21. "[T]here is a standard GATT-style argument that says that countries
should, in the name of the collective interest, deny themselves the right to im-
pose TRIMs." Id. at 150.
22. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 6.
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been aptly phrased, "[t]he damage done by TRIMs is ... subtle
and, like lead poisoning, cumulative. '23
Politics has also played a significant role in the debate. Sov-
ereignty is a sensitive issue, and many nations, especially those
with a history of being colonized 24 or with a powerful and per-
haps overbearing neighbor,25 feel that unrestricted FDI would
threaten their independence. 26 As a means of regulating FDI,
then, TRIMs have the correlative effect of asserting national
sovereignty and pride.
The developed nations have had a political agenda as well.
Multinational corporations, with direct investments in several
nations around the globe, tend to preserve economic and polit-
ical stability as an adjunct to their operations. 27 Economic self-
interest, combined with political power over their home country
governments, promotes diplomacy and international coopera-
tion.28 Multinational corporations and developed nations thus
advocate greater investment liberalization, including the re-
moval of TRIMs, as a means of furthering political stability and,
ultimately, economic prosperity.
B. CANADA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEw ACT
It may seem odd that Canada, a developed nation that is
home to a substantial number of multinational corporations, 29
would pass a TRIMs-laden statute, and that this statute would
provide the impetus for bringing TRIMs to the fore of GATT ne-
gotiations. But because of its proximity to the United States,
23. Graham & Krugman, supra note 11, at 159.
24. The recent crisis in Indonesia has provided at least one example of the
threat to national independence many developing nations feel from FDI. The
son of former Indonesian President Suharto, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra,
called the recent IMF agreement with Indonesia a form of "neocolonialism." The
agreement revoked many of the benefits the Indonesian government had be-
stowed on Tommy's automobile manufacturing company and loosened re-
straints on FDI. See Suharto's Son Calls Accord with IMF "Neocolonialism,"
AsIAN ECONOMIC NEWS, Jan. 19, 1998, available in Westlaw, AECON Database.
25. Canada comes immediately to mind. See infra note 30 and accompany-
ing text.
26. See generally MARGARET M. PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT UNDER SO-
CIALISM 9-10 (1991) (discussing the view of some Marxists that FDI is a means
of neocolonialism).
27. See Atik, supra note 4, at 7 n.26.
28. See, e.g., id. at 17 (attributing the success of the European Union on the
political links between the member nations).
29. See id. at 20 n.95.
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Canada has long been highly sensitive to FDI.30 Canada's For-
eign Investment Review Act 3 ' (FIRA) prompted the United
States to file a complaint under GATT Article XX111 32 in 1982.
The subsequent panel decision that FIRA violated Article 111:4
of GATT33 galvanized the developed nations and spurred negoti-
ations toward the TRIMs Agreement.34
The Canadian Parliament enacted FIRA on December 12,
1973 in order to ensure that businesses in Canada established or
acquired by foreigners would be of "significant benefit to Can-
ada."3 5 Only after such a finding by a parade of government
agencies, commissioners, and ministers, as well as a final deter-
mination by the Governor in Council that, yes, the business was
of significant benefit, would a foreign-owned business be allowed
to begin or continue operations.36 FIRA listed five factors that
the Agency would consider in making its determination, one of
which adverted to local content and export performance require-
ments: "the effect [of the foreign business] ... on the utilization
of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on
exports from Canada."37
30. See id. at 6. Indeed, Canada is sensitive to any incursion by the United
States. The latest fear stems from the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment, a proposal for open FDI discussed infra, which some Canadian offi-
cials fear will result in American pop culture inundating Canada and
obliterating Canadian culture. See Rosanna Tamburri, Canada Considers New
Stand Against American Culture, THE WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998 at A18.
31. Foreign Investment Review Act, S.C., ch. 46 (1973-74) (Can.) [hereinaf-
ter FIRA].
32. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
34. See Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
Feb. 7, 1984, 30 B.I.S.D. 157 (1984) [hereinafter FIRA Panel Report].
35. FIRA, supra note 31, § 2(1). FIRA's statement of purpose posited that
"the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic envi-
ronment is a matter of national concern." Id. The Act, however, did not say why
this ability should be "a matter of national concern," but it most surely had
more to do with national pride than economics. See supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text.
36. FIRA § 7(1) established a Foreign Investment Review Agency "to ad-
vise and assist the Minister in connection with the administration of this Act."
FIRA, supra note 31, § 7(1). It also provided for a Commissioner of the Agency
who would respond to the Minister. See id. § 7(2). The Minister in turn would
report to the Governor in Council whether the foreign-owned business benefited
Canada and therefore should be allowed. See id. §§ 10, 11. The Governor in
Council would then make the final determination and issue an order. See id.
§ 12.
37. Id. § 2(2)(a). Section 2(2) of FIRA lists the five factors as follows:
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of
economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization
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FIRA permitted, but did not require, foreign investors to
submit "written undertakings" outlining their business plan
and, presumably, demonstrating how their business would be of
"significant benefit to Canada."38 These undertakings became
routine and consisted mainly of three types: purchase undertak-
ings, manufacturing undertakings, and export undertakings. 39
While submissions were optional, they became legally binding
on the business once the Canadian government approved the
proposed investment. 40
In its complaint, the United States argued that the
purchase and manufacturing undertakings violated GATT Arti-
cles 111:4,41 111:5,42 XI:1, 43 and XVII:I(c). 44 The United States
further contended that the export undertakings also violated Ar-
of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on exports from
Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the busi-
ness enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of
which the business enterprise or new business forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial
efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety
in Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any
industry or industries in Canada; and
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national in-
dustrial and economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and eco-
nomic policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any
province likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment.
Id. § 2(2).
38. Id. § 9.
39. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 143-44.
40. See FIRA, supra note 31, §§ 19-21.
41. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 146. Article III of GATT is the
Agreement's "national treatment" provision. Article III:4 prohibits non-tax
measures that discriminate against imported goods after they have cleared cus-
toms. It reads in relevant part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 7, art. III:4.
42. Article 111:5 proscribes local content requirements. It reads in part:
No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantita-
tive regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in
specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly,
that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the
subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources.
Id. art. 111:5.
43. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 146. Article XI is GATT's
general prohibition against quantitative restrictions-that is, non-tax barriers
applied to imported goods at the border. Article XI:1 reads:
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ticle XVII:I(c) of GATT45 and that all these violations consti-
tuted nullification and impairment under GATT Article XXII. 46
Canada countered that the purchase undertakings, since volun-
tary, were not "laws, regulations and requirements" within the
meaning of Article III:4. 47 Rather, they constituted private con-
tracts between individual corporations and the Canadian gov-
ernment.48 Finally, Canada asserted in the alternative that the
undertakings fell under the exception of Article XX:(d).49
The GATT Panel ruled that FIRA indeed violated GATT Ar-
ticle III:4.50 It dismissed Canada's contention that the purchase
undertakings were not "requirements" and held that undertak-
ings obligating a business to purchase products of Canadian ori-
gin constituted less favorable treatment to imported like
products. 51 The Panel, however, ruled that the purchase under-
takings did not violate Article XI: 1, for they did not prevent the
importation of goods but only discriminated against them once
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 7, art. XI:I.
44. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 146. Article XVII refers in
general to state-trading enterprises, those businesses established and run by
the government. Article XVII:I(c) prevents governments from prohibiting any
enterprise within its jurisdiction from behaving toward goods in a non-discrimi-
natory manner and with regard for commercial considerations. See GATT,
supra note 7, art. XVII:1(c).
45. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 154-55. See also supra note
44 and accompanying text (describing Article XVII:I(c) of GATT).
46. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 146. Article XXIII of GATT is
the Agreement's dispute resolution provision. Violations of the Agreement are
considered to involve the "nullification or impairment" of "any benefit accruing
to [a contracting party] directly or indirectly under this Agreement" or "the at-
tainment of any objective of the Agreement." GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII:I.
47. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 148. See also supra note 41
and accompanying text (describing Article III:4 of GATT).
48. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 149.
49. See id. at 155. GATT Article XX contains the general exceptions to the
GATT disciplines. The Canadian government was invoking that part of Article
XX:(d) which reads:
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . .. necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.
GATT, supra note 7, art. XX:(d).
50. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 158-62.
51. See id. at 158-59.
[Vol. 8:97
THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
imported. 52 The Panel also found that the export undertakings
were not inconsistent with Article XVII:I(c), 53 and that Articles
111:5 and XX:(d) were inapplicable. 54
Two aspects of the FIRA controversy stand out. First, from
the United States and the developed nations' standpoint, GATT
was only partially successful. It disposed of the most egregious
TRIM, the local content requirement euphemized as a purchase
undertaking. Yet it failed to defeat the export performance re-
quirement, the "export undertaking."
Second, the rift between the developed and developing na-
tions over FDI and TRIMs was brought to the forefront when
Argentina intervened in the dispute, ostensibly to protect the in-
terests of developing countries. Argentina asked the Panel to
distinguish between the purchase and export undertakings,
which it felt fell under GATT competence, and FIRA, which as
national legislation did not.55 Furthermore, Argentina noted
that the FIRA dispute involved developed nations, and therefore
the arguments asserted against the Canadian Act did not neces-
sarily apply to similar protective legislation adopted by develop-
ing nations. 56 The Panel acknowledged the special concessions
granted to developing countries under GATT, citing in particu-
lar Article XVIII:C,5 7 but declined to rule on the applicability of
its decision to developing countries. 58
C. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
The FIRA controversy and subsequent Panel Report
brought TRIMs to the fore of GATT negotiations and exposed
the need for clarifying GATT's relationship to investment meas-
52. See id. at 162-63. In making this distinction, the Panel followed the
accepted interpretation that Article XI applies to the importation of goods and
Article III to imported goods.
53. See id. at 163.
54. See id. at 162, 164-65.
55. See id. at 157. By arguing that FIRA itself remained outside of GATT,
Argentina was reasserting the importance of national sovereignty to developing
nations. See supra notes 24, 25, 26 and accompanying text.
56. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 157.
57. Article XVIII:C provides "provisions and procedures" that permit devel-
oping nations to impose measures inconsistent with GATT in order "to promote
the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the general
standard of living of its people." GATT, supra note 7, art. XVIII:C. To fall under
Article XVIII:C's protection, a developing nation must have an economy "which
can only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of develop-
ment." Id. art. XVIII:4(a).
58. See FIRA Panel Report, supra note 34, at 158.
1999]
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
ures.5 9 The controversy also signaled a new direction for free
trade analysis, one that had been taking shape since the
1960s. 60 Rather than focusing on reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to free trade among nations, barriers which GATT had
been quite successful in removing, 6 1 trade analysts began to
turn their attention to the trade-distorting effects of national
trade policies.6 2
This shift in focus was tied to historical developments. With
the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War II and the
reemergence of their industrial economies, the economic
problems of developing nations assumed center stage.6 3 At first,
much of the concern centered on those nations' balance of pay-
ment problems, but with the economic crises of the 1970s the
entire structure of different nations' economies came under scru-
tiny, including trade policies. 64 Even before FIRA, then, trade
policy had been identified as a key issue for trade negotiations in
the 1980s.
The United States was the primary advocate for bringing
TRIMs within GATT, 65 formally broaching the subject at a
meeting of the Consultative Group of 18 in 1981.66 After the
FIRA controversy and Panel Report in 1984, the United States
and other developed nations pushed harder for multilateral ne-
gotiations on TRIMs. TRIMs thus became a central feature of
the Uruguay Round.
The Negotiating Group on TRIMs convened in March 1987
with a mandate to clarify GATT's relationship to investment
measures-essentially, to clarify the FIRA ruling.67 Three
stages of negotiations were proposed: first, discussions would
59. See Michael Hart, A Multilateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Why Now?, in INVESTMENT RULES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ENHANCING
ACCESS TO MARKETS 36, 70 (Pierre Sauv6 & Daniel Schwanen eds., 1996); Todd
S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 541, 564 (1994).
60. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 102.
61. See Atik, supra note 4, at 9.
62. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 102.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 1 n.2.
66. See Graham & Krugman, supra note 11, at 150.
67. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 102-03. The mandate read: "Following an
examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive
and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as
appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse
effects on trade." Id. at 103.
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elucidate the relationship of GATT articles to TRIMs; second,
contracting parties would propose new provisions regarding
TRIMs not covered by GATT articles; and third, parties would
agree on new directions the negotiations should take as a result
of the Group's inquiry.68 The Negotiating Group held twenty-
three formal meetings, as well as numerous informal ones, and
produced several drafts of an agreement.69
From the start, the parties divided along the lines of devel-
oped and developing nations, each side with its own agenda. 70
The developed nations (the United States, Europe, and Japan)
wanted investment measures to be unequivocally incorporated
within GATT. They felt that GATT as it stood inadequately ad-
dressed TRIMs and trade policy, and that the TRIMs Agreement
should extend GATT jurisdiction to cover both.7 1 Furthermore,
the developed nations advocated explicit prohibitions as the
means of eradicating TRIMs. 72
The developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
on the other hand, argued that investment measures fell outside
GATT competence and that they should remain outside.73 After
all, they reasoned, GATT addressed trade in goods only, not in-
vestment; therefore, only the trade-distorting effects of TRIMs,
not the investment measures themselves, could be brought
under GATT discipline. 74 Moreover, they contended that GATT
sufficiently contemplated those effects, and thus no explicit
prohibitions were necessary. 75 Instead the developing nations
advocated an "effects test" that would be based on empirical evi-
dence of trade distortion. 76 They also insisted on a transition pe-
riod for implementing any provisions of an agreement that
might apply to developing countries. 77
D. THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
The final draft of the TRIMs Agreement was a compromise,
a modest attempt to address what had become a highly conten-
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 104.
72. See id. at 105.
73. See id. at 104.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 104-05.
76. See id. at 105.
77. See id.
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tious trade issue.78 The polarization of the negotiating parties
compelled each side to make concessions. 79 The developing na-
tions succeeded in limiting the scope of the Agreement to trade
in goods only and in incorporating a transition period, but the
developed nations were able to set out explicit prohibitions
against certain investment measures. However, only the first
stage of negotiations,80 that which sought to clarify the relation-
ship between GATT and investment measures, resulted in sub-
stantive provisions in the Agreement itself. There were no new
provisions regarding investment measures that did not already
fall under GATT, and no new directions for negotiations were
proposed with any specificity.8 '
The purpose of the TRIMs Agreement, as stated in the pre-
amble, is "to elaborate . .. further provisions [beyond GATT]
that may be necessary to avoid [the] adverse effects [of TRIMs]
on trade" and "to promote the expansion and liberalisation of
world trade and to facilitate investment across international
frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading
partners, particularly developing country Members, while en-
suring free competition."8 2 The "further provisions" are con-
tained in Article 2 of the Agreement, which requires that all
TRIMs be consistent with GATT Articles III and XI.8 3 An annex
appended to the Agreement provides an "Illustrative List" of in-
vestment measures that are deemed inconsistent with GATT,
including the local content requirements that Canada tried to
impose via the purchase undertakings sanctioned under FIRA.8 4
78. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 1.
79. See Jonathan Startup, An Agenda for International Investment, in THE
NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 189, 189 (Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development ed., 1994).
80. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
81. Article 9 provides for a review of the Agreement within five years of its
implementation and recommends that the review consider new proposals that
might complement the Agreement's provisions; however, the Agreement pro-
poses nothing specific. See TRIMs, supra note 1, art. 9. See infra note 89 and
accompanying text.
82. TRIMs, supra note 1, Preamble.
83. Article 2.1 reads: "Without prejudice to other rights and obligations
under GATT 1994, No Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with
the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994." Id. art. 2.1.
One can legitimately question whether these provisions go "further" than
GATT. After all, they really only incorporate GATT Articles III and XI into the
Agreement. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
84. The Annex to the TRIMS Agreement states in relevant part:
TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those
which... require... the purchase or use by an enterprise of products
[Vol. 8:97
THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
The TRIMs Agreement contains several other provisions,
many of which merely reaffirm GATT disciplines and reapply
them to TRIMs: transparency requirements, exceptions, and dis-
pute settlement procedures.85 The Agreement also requires noti-
fication to the Council for Trade in Goods of all prohibited
TRIMs in existence at the time the Agreement goes into effect
and supplies a timetable for their gradual elimination.8 6 The lat-
ter stipulates that developed nations must eliminate prohibited
TRIMs within two years, developing nations within five years,
and "least-developed" nations within seven.8 7 The Agreement
also establishes a Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures.88
Perhaps the most unassuming provision in the TRIMs
Agreement is the most telling. Article 9 requires the Council for
Trade in Goods to review the Agreement within five years to
"consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with
provisions on investment policy and competition policy."8 9 It
supplies no plan or procedure for doing so. As if aware that it
should move further into new territory, yet unwilling or unable
to do so, the TRIMs Agreement in effect confesses its shortcom-
ings in Article 9. It articulates its own inefficacy.
of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in
terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products,
or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.
Id. Annex 1(a).
85. Article 6 reaffirms the transparency and notification obligations of
GATT Article X. See id. art. 6. Article 3 stipulates that all exceptions under
GATT apply to the TRIMs Agreement. See id. art. 3. Article 8 appropriates
GATT's dispute settlement process embodied in GATT Articles XXII, XXIII, and
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the Uruguay Round Agreements. See
id. art. 8.
86. See id. art. 5. Article 5.4 bars from the transitional arrangement all
TRIMs introduced within 180 days before the Agreement takes effect. See id.
art. 5.4. It also prohibits modifying any TRIMs during the transition period that
would "increase the degree of inconsistency with the provisions of Article 2" of
the TRIMs Agreement. See id. Article 5.5 permits applying TRIMs during the
transition period to a new enterprise if established enterprises producing like
products are already subject to TRIMs, and competition between the new and
old enterprises would otherwise be distorted. See id. art. 5.5.
87. See id. art. 5.2. Article 5.3 provides some flexibility in the timetable.
The Council for Trade in Goods may extend the transition period if a developing
nation "demonstrates particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of
this Agreement." Id. art. 5.3.
88. See id. art. 7. This Committee is primarily responsible for consulting
with member nations and monitoring for the Council for Trade in Goods regard-
ing "the operation and implementation" of the TRIMs Agreement. Id.
89. See id. art. 9.
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II. TRIMS AND AUTOMOBILE CONTROVERSIES
A. TRIMs AND THE AuTo INDUSTRY
It is fitting that the first test of the power and scope of the
TRIMs Agreement should involve the automobile industry, a
sector long subject to trade and investment regulation. 90 Local
content requirements, import quotas, and voluntary export re-
straints have been common throughout the industry in both de-
veloping and developed nations.9 1 Indeed, Japan recently
accused the United States of imposing a local content require-
ment via "de facto coercion" in seeking to get Japanese
automakers in America to use more locally-produced parts.92
The reason for the special treatment of the auto industry in
trade and investment lies in the industry's importance to a na-
tional economy. A nation's auto industry has enormous impact
on its employment, gross national product, and tax revenue,
among other things. Nations with either incipient or established
auto industries tend to be highly protective of them, while at the
same time decrying the protectionist measures imposed by other
nations which curtail export markets. Ignoring the United
States' own questionable automobile industry policies, U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky recently declared:
"In the light of the importance of the U.S. auto industry to the
U.S. economy, eliminating foreign barriers to U.S. exports of au-
tos and auto parts is of vital importance to the industry's eco-
nomic growth and to U.S. national economic interests."9 3
Barshefsky's comment came in response to the automobile
trade and investment policies of Brazil and Indonesia. On Octo-
ber 1, 1996, the United States launched a Section 30194 investi-
gation against those two nations, alleging violations of the
90. See George Kleinfeld & Deborah Wengel, Foreign Investment, 31 INT'L
LAW. 403, 404-05 (1997). See also Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 4 (not-
ing that TRIMs tend to be concentrated in particular industries, including the
automobile industry).
91. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 4, 39-42, tbl. 3.
92. See U.S. "Coercion" of Japanese Automakers Raises Legal Issues, MITI
Report Charges, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Mar. 31, 1995, available in Westlaw
BNA-BTD Database.
93. Felsenthal, supra note 5.
94. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 delegates authority to the Executive
Branch-specifically, to the United States Trade Representative under the di-
rection of the President-to take unilateral retaliatory action if it determines
that the rights of the United States under a trade agreement are being denied
or violated by a foreign nation. Id.
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TRIMs Agreement. 9 5 Subsequently, during a meeting of the
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures held on
March 17, 1997, the United States formally accused Brazil and
Indonesia of violating the Agreement. 96 The European Union
and Japan supported the charge. 97 To date, no WTO Panel has
been formed in the Brazilian dispute, and the Indonesian contro-
versy has been resolved by the exigencies of that nation's recent
economic crisis. But both nations' policies, the numerous com-
plaints those policies have elicited, and their resolutions expose
the ineffectiveness of the TRIMs Agreement and the need for
new directions in international investment policy.
B. THE TRIMs AGREEMENT AND BRAZIL's AUTO REGIME
Brazil has taken a series of measures in recent years that
have provoked sharp criticism from developed nations, including
doubling the duty on automobile imports in November 1996 and
stipulating a tariff increase to 16% in 2000.98 But the auto re-
gime that was first revealed in December 1995 and which took
effect in February 1996 has fomented the most controversy. It
contains two TRIMs: a local content requirement and a trade-
balancing regulation. Under the regime, which will remain in
place through 1999, auto manufacturers can receive tariff reduc-
tions of up to 90% on imported capital goods, between 40% and
80% on imported raw materials, parts, and components, and
50% on imported assembled automobiles. 99 In order to qualify
for these reductions, producers must meet a local content re-
quirement of 60% domestically produced parts in their domesti-
cally produced vehicles. 1 0 0 They must also maintain a one-to-one
ratio of imported to domestic capital goods and imported to do-
mestic raw materials. 10 ' The trade-balancing regulation re-
quires that, in order to qualify for the tariff reductions, a
producer may not permit its imports of raw materials and as-
sembled automobiles to exceed its net exports.' 0 2 In addition, its
imports of auto parts may not exceed two-thirds of net
exports. 103
95. See Felsenthal, supra note 5.
96. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at 406.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
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The Brazilian government introduced yet another program
in December 1996 which also imposed a local content require-
ment. ' 0 4 Ostensibly enacted as an incentive for automobile man-
ufacturers to set up plants in the impoverished northeast region
of Brazil, the program eliminates tariffs on auto parts and raw
materials if the manufacturers meet a local content requirement
of 60%.105
Japan submitted the first formal complaint against Brazil
to the WTO on July 30, 1996, alleging violations of TRIMs
Agreement Article 2, GATT Articles :1, III:4, and XI:I, Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agree-
ment) Articles 3, 27.2, 27.4, and nonviolation nullification and
impairment under GATT Article XXIII:I(b). 10 6 Shortly thereaf-
ter, on August 8, 1996, the United States asked to join the con-
sultations, the first part of the dispute settlement process under
GATT. 1 0 7 A day later, the United States filed a formal complaint
with the WTO which alleged many of the same violations as Ja-
pan.108 The European Union weighed in with a similar com-
104. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
105. See id. Tariffs on auto parts and raw materials are currently set be-
tween 2% and 18%. See id.
106. See Brazil-Certain Automotive Investment Measures, Request for Con-
sultations by Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS51/1 (Aug. 6, 1996) (visited Oct. 12, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org>.
107. See Brazil-Certain Automotive Investment Measures, Request to Join
Consultations, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS51/4
(Aug. 15, 1996) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org> [hereinafter WT/
D551/4]. GATT Article XXIII calls for consultations between disputing parties
"with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter." GATT, supra note 7,
art. XXII: 1. Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding) supplies the
rules governing consultations. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExTS [hereinafter
DSU]. The United States asked to join the consultations between Japan and
Brazil pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, which permits nations with "a sub-
stantial trade interest" to intervene in consultations being held between other
nations. Id. art. 4.11. In its request, the United States alleged that "[als a sig-
nificant exporter of both motor vehicles and auto parts to Brazil" it had a sub-
stantial trade interest in the consultations. WT/DS51/4 (Aug. 8, 1996). The
United States noted that in 1995 it exported approximately $850 million worth
of cars and parts to Brazil. Id.
108. See Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Au-
tomotive Sector, Request for Consultation by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/
DS52/1 (Aug. 14, 1996) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
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plaint on May 7, 1997.109 None of the complainifig parties
requested the formation of a GATT dispute panel, preferring in-
stead to try to resolve the conflict through negotiations. No
panel has been established.
The Brazilian controversy reveals several reasons for the
TRIMs Agreement's ineffectiveness in preventing and remedy-
ing TRIMs. All stem from the Agreement's glaring unoriginality,
its refusal to confront issues regarding investment measures
which have not previously been faced. First, the complaints
themselves demonstrate that the Agreement is redundant. Each
complaint, in addition to alleging violations of TRIMs Article 2,
alleges violations of GATT. 110 This should not be surprising,
since TRIMs Article 2.1 merely prohibits TRIMs that are "incon-
sistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT
1994."111 TRIMs Article 2.2 is perhaps more helpful in that it
refers to the "Illustrative List" in the Agreement's Annex which
gives concrete examples of inconsistent TRIMs. 112 The local con-
tent requirement and trade-balancing regulation at issue in the
Brazilian controversy form part of this list.113 But such exam-
ples of TRIMs are certainly not beyond the ken of the trade ex-
perts who are called upon to serve on GATT panels and surely
need not be flagged in order to be noticed.
Furthermore, the FIRA Panel has already ruled that local
content requirements violate GATT Article 111:4.114 Even
though stare decisis is not as firm a doctrine in GATT proceed-
109. See Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Au-
tomotive Sector, Request for Consultation by the European Communities, WTO
Doc. WT/DS81/1 (May 20, 1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
110. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
111. TRIMs, supra note 1, art. 2.1.
112. See id. art. 2.2.
113. TRIMs Annex l(a) expressly prohibits local content requirements that
are inconsistent with Article III of GATT. It prohibits TRIMs which require "the
purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its
local production." Id. Annex 1(a).
TRIMs Annex 1(b) prohibits trade-balancing regulations that are inconsis-
tent with Article III of GATT. It prohibits TRIMs which require "that an enter-
prise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to
the volume or value of local products that it exports." Id. Annex l(b).
TRIMs Annex 2(a) prohibits trade-balancing regulations as inconsistent
with Article XI of GATT. It prohibits TRIMs which restrict "the importation by
an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, generally or
to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports."
Id. Annex 2(a).
114. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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ings as in American jurisprudence, precedent still carries great
authoritative weight, especially when embodied in a ruling as
clear and unambiguous as the FIRA Panel Report. 115 True, the
issue of trade-balancing did not arise in the FIRA controversy,
and the FIRA Panel declined to hold that Canada's purchase un-
dertakings violated GATT Article XI, 116 but its refusal to do so
should not be construed to mean that Article XI does not protect
against trade-balancing regulations. Indeed, the failure to find
an Article XI violation in FIRA should be ascribed to the drafters
of the United States's complaint rather than to the FIRA Panel.
The United States only alleged that the purchase and manufac-
turing undertakings violated Article XI; 1 17 the export undertak-
ings-an export performance requirement akin to Brazil's trade-
balancing regulation and susceptible to challenge under GATT
Article XI-were only alleged to violate GATT Article
XVII:I(c). 118 Brazil's trade-balancing regulation, which links a
foreign-owned corporation's imports to its exports, undoubtedly
constitutes a quantitative restriction-that is, an import or ex-
port restriction applied at the border. As such, it violates GATT
Article XI:'s prohibition against quantitative restrictions,' 1 9
and therefore does not need to be brought before the WTO under
the TRIMs Agreement.
Regardless of whether the developed nations chose to bring
complaints against Brazil's local content requirement or trade-
balancing regulation under GATT or the TRIMs Agreement (or
both, as was the case), the dispute settlement process would
have been the same. The TRIMs Agreement is redundant on this
point, too. Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement merely appropri-
ates GATT's dispute settlement mechanism.' 20 It succinctly
states that "[t]he provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT
1994, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding, shall apply to consultations and the settlement of
disputes under this Agreement."' 2 ' In the Brazilian controversy,
each complaining party brought both violation and nonviolation
nullification or impairment actions against Brazil under GATT
115. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 89-90 (1989).
116. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
120. See TRIMs, supra note 1, art. 8.
121. Id. See also supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-
visions on consultations in the Dispute Settlement Understanding).
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Article XXIII1 2 2 This action, and any subsequent settlement
process under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 123 is suf-
ficient to the complainants' ends.
Redundancy is not the TRIMs Agreement's only flaw. The
Agreement does nothing beyond recapitulating Articles III, XI,
and the dispute settlement process of GATT. 124 Indeed, in sev-
eral ways, the TRIMs Agreement may be fighting the last war, a
war already won under GATT and the FIRA ruling. Yet the Bra-
zilian controversy cries out for new, innovative approaches to
the problem of TRIMs and FDI, and the Agreement offers no re-
sponse. The global economic changes that have taken place since
the mid-1980s require a rethinking of the historic rift between
developed and developing countries and their ossified attitudes
toward FDI. The Brazilian controversy highlights two aspects of
these economic changes and finds the TRIMs Agreement want-
ing in dealing with them.
First, the TRIMs Agreement fails to address the salient fact
that, in today's international economy, developing nations are
hurt by TRIMs between themselves; the old paradigm that
TRIMs benefit developing nations, and the correlative assump-
tion that unrestrained FDI exploits them, no longer holds
true. 125 Developing nations have increasingly sought to attract
FDI for all the reasons discussed previously. 126 FDI inflows
into developing nations have increased dramatically in the past
fifteen years. ' 27 These increases have fueled competition for FDI
among the developing nations, sometimes leading to individual
nations unilaterally dismantling their previously-imposed
TRIMs.128
122. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Nullification or impairment
under Article XXIII:1(a) involves a violation of GATT obligations. GATT, supra
note 7, art. XXIII:I(a). Nonviolation nullification or impairment under Article
XXIII:I(b) occurs when a nation applies a measure which upsets the competi-
tive relationship or conditions bargained for by two or more nations, even
though the measure itself does not violate GATT. Id. art. XXIII:(b).
123. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 111 and 120 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. See also Daniel
Schwanen, Investment and the Global Economy: Key Issues in Rulemaking, in
INVESTMENT RULES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ENHANCING ACCESS TO MAR-
KETs, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that most countries formerly suspicious of FDI
have now become interested in attracting it).
126. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
127. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 11; Simandjuntak, supra
note 16, at 7.
128. See Simandjuntak, supra note 16, at 7-8.
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But TRIMs, of course, can also be used to attract FDI, as
Brazil has done in granting tariff reductions for meeting its local
content requirements. 129 Such use over the years has led to in-
equities between developing nations in their current ability to
attract FDI to particular economic sectors. In some cases, it has
pitted the interests of one developing nation against those of an-
other, destroying the unified front developing nations have tra-
ditionally put forth against the incursions, real or perceived, of
developed nations.130 The Brazilian controversy provides an ex-
ample. Argentina, a developing nation that stood up for the in-
terests of other developing nations during the FIRA
controversy, 131 strongly protested the Brazilian program. 132 Ar-
gentina had implemented its own auto program in the early
1990s, enacting similar investment measures which combined
tax and tariff incentives with local content requirements. 133 The
foreign automakers attracted by these measures invested in lo-
cal production facilities and as a result helped Argentina de-
velop a trade surplus in automobiles with Brazil.'3 The
Argentine government viewed Brazil's new regime as a threat to
its own program and the success it has had in attracting foreign
automobile manufacturers. 135
In other words, by imposing TRIMs as incentives earlier
than Brazil, Argentina now has a tremendous advantage over
Brazil in the automotive sector-an advantage it would like to
preserve. And the TRIMs Agreement will help Argentina pre-
serve it. In fact, rather than remedying the inequalities between
the two nations produced by TRIMs, the TRIMs Agreement ex-
acerbates them. Under the Agreement's phase-out provision, Ar-
gentina has five years to remove its TRIMs. 136 Brazil is barred
from imposing any. Foreign automakers already have facilities
established in Argentina, and it is unlikely they will pull out
even if the Argentine tariff reductions were abrogated. Brazil
will have a difficult time achieving parity with Argentina on its
own.
129. See supra notes 99-100 and 104-05 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
132. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
133. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at 406.
134. See id.
135. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
136. See TRIMs, supra note 1, art. 5.2. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
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The TRIMs Agreement also fails to confront the unequal ef-
fects of TRIMs on competitors within an economic sector and the
ramifications of those effects for a nation's trade policy. Again,
the Brazilian controversy illustrates the point. General Motors
and Ford already had substantial facilities in place before the
Brazilian program went into effect, and consequently both man-
ufacturers easily qualified for the reduced tariffs. 137 Reduced
tariffs on capital goods, auto parts, and raw materials gave them
a price advantage in the Brazilian market for their domestically
produced cars, and lower tariffs on assembled cars provided an
advantage for their imports. 138
The U.S. government, however, found itself in a quandary.
It felt obliged to lodge a complaint with the WTO in order to
preserve the TRIMs Agreement and forestall any further TRIMs
that other nations might be tempted to impose. 139 As U.S. Trade
Representative Barshefsky noted, the United States complaint
reflected not only the importance of the auto industry, but the
importance of "preventing the adoption of similar barriers by
other countries around the world.' 40 In other words, although
some U.S. producers benefitted from the Brazilian TRIMs,
others were hurt by them, and TRIMs more broadly applied
would have overall negative ramifications for U.S. industry. The
Brazilian controversy thus illustrates the distorting effects of
TRIMs not only on trade and investment, but also on govern-
mental policies toward trade and investment. The TRIMs Agree-
ment, confined to investment measures that affect trade in goods
only, stops short of addressing the important policy issues the
Brazilian controversy raises.
C. THE TRIMs AGREEMENT AND INDONESIA'S "PIONEER AUTO
PROGRAM"
While the Brazilian auto regime applies to foreign
automakers operating facilities in Brazil-Brazil having no in-
digenous automobile industry-Indonesia's auto regime was
137. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at 406. Volkswagen also had
facilities in Brazil. See id. Honda, however, did not, and the Japanese auto
manufacturer's exports to Brazil plummeted after the Brazilian auto regime
went into effect. See id. Honda's exports from its U.S. plants fell to 821 over the
first three quarters of 1996, down from 4,049 during the same period in 1995.
Id. These statistics probably explain why Japan was the first nation to lodge a
complaint against Brazil. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 407.
140. Felsenthal, supra note 5.
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specifically tailored to establishing its own national industry.
Frustrated by Japanese control of 90% of Indonesia's car mar-
ket 141 and inspired by Malaysia's success in developing its own
national auto industry, 142 President Suharto initiated the "Pio-
neer Auto Program" in February 1996 to establish a national in-
dustry and produce a national car.143
From the outset, the program reeked of nepotism and cor-
ruption. 144 Only one car company, PT Timor Putra Nasional,
qualified for the program's tax and tariff reductions, and that
company happened to be owned and operated by one of Presi-
dent Suharto's sons, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra. 145 More-
over, the company's national car, the "Timor," wasn't even
national; it was produced as a joint venture with the well-estab-
lished Kia Motors of Korea.146 The plan had originally been for
the joint venture, known as PT Kia Timor Motors, to build a
manufacturing plant in Cikampek, West Java.147 The plant
would have begun operations in October 1998, producing 70,000
Timor sedans and 50,000 sport utility vehicles.' 48 Both state-
owned and private Indonesian banks had agreed to finance the
project through a five-year $690 million loan. 149 In the
meantime, however, President Suharto decreed in June 1996
that the joint venture could import 45,000 fully-assembled
141. See Japanese Automakers to Face Sharp Rivalry in Indonesia, ASIAN
ECON. NEWS, Sept. 4, 1995, available in Westlaw AECON Database. Some
sources have placed the Japanese share of Indonesia's car market as high as
95%. See Michael Chinworth, Kia Restructures as It Teeters on Bankruptcy, Au-
TOMOTIVE ENGINEERING, Oct. 1, 1997, at 83-84.
142. See Indonesia: Letter of Intent for Setting-Up National Automobile In-
dustry, Rover Group (U.K.)-Order #:011994, EXPORT SALES PROSPECTOR, Jan.,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2246444.
143. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
144. One source called the program "just the sort of cozy deal for the well-
connected that Indonesia is known for." Rahul Jacob, The Perfect Family Car
for the Suhartos, That Is, But a Lack of Interest Among Other Indonesians
Could Doom Son Tommy's Sedan, TIME INT'L., Nov. 10, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13376392. President Suharto's son Tommy controlled the only car company
to qualify for the program. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Some
quipped that the name of the car, the Timor, stands for "Tommy Itu Memang
Orang Rakus," which is Indonesian for "Tommy is Indeed a Greedy Man." Id.
145. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5; Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at
409.
146. See S.N. Vasuki, Kia Rescue Leaves Indonesian Car Project in the
Lurch, BusINEss TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7773239.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
118 [Vol. 8:97
THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
Timors duty-free from Kia plants in Korea 5 0-an astounding
200% tariff reduction. 15 1 The only requirement was that the Ko-
rean manufacturer use 20% Indonesian parts in its production
or purchase an equivalent amount of parts for other purposes, as
well as employ a minimum number of Indonesian workers at its
Korean plant. 152
The "Pioneer Auto Program" contained two features that vi-
olated the Uruguay Round Agreements: a local content require-
ment and an import preference. The local content requirement-
20% in a manufacturer's first year of production, 40% in its sec-
ond year, 60% in its third-would qualify the manufacturer for
duty-free imports of auto parts and raw materials and exempt it
from a 35% luxury tax on each automobile. 153 The import prefer-
ence consisted of the concession granted to PT Kia Timor Motors
to import 45,000 Timors duty-free.' 5 4
On October 3, 1996, the European Union submitted the first
formal complaint to the WTO, alleging violations of Articles I
and III of GATT, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article
3 of the SCM Agreement.' 5 5 Within days, Japan and the United
States followed suit.156 In November and December of 1996, the
European Union held bilateral consultations with Indonesia but
failed to reach an agreement. 157 Unlike in the Brazilian contro-
versy, all three complainants eventually requested that the dis-
pute settlement body establish a panel to hear and rule on their
claims. 158 Indonesia tried to block the European Union's re-
150. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at 409.
151. See Parry & Taylor, supra note 5.
152. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 90, at 409.
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
155. See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry: Re-
quest for Consultations by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/1
(Oct. 14, 1996) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www/wto/org>.
156. See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry: Re-
quest for Consultations from Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS55/1 (Oct. 10, 1996) (vis-
ited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>; Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry: Request for Consultations by the United States, WTO
Doc. WT/DS59/1 (Oct. 15, 1996) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
157. See Japan Pushes for Setup of WTO Panel on Indonesia's National Car
Policy, ANTARA, May 26, 1997.
158. Japan requested a panel on April 17, 1997. Indonesia-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS55/6-WT/DS64/4 (Apr. 18, 1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org>. The European Union requested a panel on May 12, 1997.
See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry: Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/
DS54/6 (May 13, 1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>. The
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quest,159 but the dispute settlement body nevertheless estab-
lished a panel on June 12, 1997.160 The Panel began hearings in
December 1997161 and was expected to make a ruling sometime
in April 1998162-that is, until the Asian economic crisis
intervened.
The economic crisis brought Indonesia's "Pioneer Auto Pro-
gram" to a swift demise. The crisis first affected the Kia Group,
the parent company of Kia Motors.' 63 The Korean government
felt that Kia Motors' viability was essential-partly because of
its lucrative involvement in the Indonesian car program-and
therefore moved to prop up the auto company and separate it
from the rest of the Kia Group.' 6 4 A state-owned Korean bank
tried to bail out the company, 16 5 and soon the auto manufac-
turer was placed in receivership. 166
The Asian economic crisis, of course, hit Indonesia hard,
and the "Pioneer Auto Program" soon became a major sticking
point in the Indonesian government's negotiations with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) for a multi-billion dollar relief
package. 167 One industry analyst commented that the Kia Mo-
tors collapse offered the Indonesian government a face-saving
way out of its auto program, 168 which by now had become a dis-
United States' request came on June 12, 1997. See Indonesia-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS59/6 (June 13, 1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org>.
159. See ANTARA, supra note 157.
160. See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry:
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Japan and the European
Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS55/7-WT/DS645 (Aug. 1, 1997) (visited Oct. 12,
1998) <http://www.wto.org>. Under Article 9 of the DSU, "[wihere more than
one Member requests the establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a
single panel may be established to examine these complaints." DSU, supra note
107, art. 9. Accordingly, a single panel was established to hear all the com-
plaints lodged against Indonesia. See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry: Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of
Japan, the European Communities and the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS55/
8-WT/DS64/6 (Aug. 5, 1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
161. See WTO Begins Hearing Indonesian National Car Complaints, ASIA
PULSE, Dec. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13574689.
162. See Vasuki, supra note 146.
163. See Chinworth, supra note 141.
164. See id.
165. See Vasuki, supra note 146.
166. See Jacob, supra note 144.
167. See Vasuki, supra note 146.
168. See id. The auto industry analyst observed that "[t]his is incredibly
good timing for Indonesia. Kia Motors has presented the Indonesian govern-
[Vol. 8:97
THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
aster.1 69 But the government wanted to continue the program,
and so agreed to abide by the WTO ruling as a means of keeping
the program out of the IMF negotiations.170 Further, the Indo-
nesian government consented to eliminating the local content
requirement by the year 2000.171 The IMF nevertheless forced
the Indonesian government to revoke many of the tax, customs,
and credit concessions it had made to PT Timor Putra Na-
sional.172 Right now, Indonesia's "Pioneer Auto Program" is
moribund, if not dead.
Like the Brazilian controversy, the Indonesian debacle dem-
onstrates the inefficacy of the TRIMs Agreement. The argument
advanced regarding the Agreement's effectiveness against Bra-
zil's local content requirement-namely, that such requirements
are adequately proscribed by GATT Article III and the FIRA rul-
ing and therefore the TRIMs Agreement's proscriptions are re-
dundant173-holds true in the Indonesian case. All three
complaints against Indonesia alleged GATT Article III as well as
TRIMs Agreement Article 2 violations,1 74 and the complainants
could have prevailed solely on the former.
But the Indonesian controversy adds two new features
about which the TRIMs Agreement is silent: an import prefer-
ence and an equity requirement. The import preference, like the
local content requirement, is sufficiently covered by GATT-in
this case, by the most-favored-nation clause (MFN clause) of Ar-
ticle 1.175 By permitting Kia Motors of Korea to import cars into
ment with a wonderful fait accompli. The government can now save face and
postpone the project." Id.
169. The Timor had been "a bomb in the marketplace." Jacob, supra note
144. Even though priced at about half the amount of its competitors, the car
sold poorly. See id. PT Timor Putra Nasional had set a sales target of 120,000
Timors by 1999, but between January and November of 1997 the company sold
only 18,193 cars-40.8% of the market share. See AsIAN ECON. NEWS, supra
note 24. Some analysts attributed the poor showing to a terrible after-sales ser-
vice network and to fears that if 76-year-old President Suharto died, so would
the Timor, thereby adversely affecting the car's resale value. See Jacob, supra
note 144. In other words, the Timor's pricing advantage was offset by its after-
sales costs to the consumer. See id.
170. See Decision of National Car Project from IMF Conditions Appropriate,
ANTARA, Nov. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15129302.
171. See id.
172. See AsiAN ECON. NEWS, supra note 24.
173. See supra notes 111 and 114 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
175. Article I states in relevant part:
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
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Indonesia duty-free, while maintaining its 200% tariff on auto
imports from other GATT-member nations, 176 Indonesia dis-
criminated between like products of different nations. Such dis-
crimination violates Article 1.177 Not surprisingly, the
complainants all alleged Article I violations in their complaints
to the WTO;178 and, as the TRIMs Agreement makes no mention
of import preferences, relief would have to be granted, if at all,
under Article I. But again, the TRIMs Agreement would be no
stronger if it proscribed import preferences; it would only be
more redundant.
Nothing in GATT or the Uruguay Round Agreements, how-
ever, prohibits equity requirements, and the TRIMs Agree-
ment's failure to do so is perhaps its biggest shortcoming. The
Indonesian car program was part and parcel of the corruption
endemic to the Indonesian economy and of the economic crisis in
Indonesia. And the program's equity requirement facilitated
both the corruption and the poor investment decisions that con-
tributed to the economic crisis. By requiring indigenous owner-
ship and control of an entire industry, the equity requirement
furthered the Suharto family's economic cronyism, for only the
first family and its inner circle possessed the capital to establish
ownership and control of any industry. By locking out foreign
capital-except Korean capital-the equity requirement effec-
tively insulated PT Timor Putra Nasional from healthy competi-
tion.-79 The IMF bailout may save Indonesia this time, but there
has been much debate over the ultimate usefulness of such IMF
rescues. °80 The IMF may not be around during the next crisis.
The TRIMs Agreement's self-restriction, its confinement to
trade in goods only, prevents it from containing two provisions
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties.
GATT, supra note 7, art. I.
176. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 155-56 and accompanying text.
179. As one scholar has observed, "openness to foreign trade and investment
is, in the final analysis, only an extension of domestic policy fostering greater
competition." Schwanen, supra note 125, at 4.
180. The IMF has come under attack by critics who feel that its bailouts
encourage risk-taking by irresponsible governments and industries. These crit-
ics believe that international investors alone should bear the risk and suffer the
consequences of their investments; such accountability would serve to reign in
risky speculation. Former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and others claim
that "the IMF's promise of massive intervention ...has spurred a global
meltdown of financial markets." George P. Shultz et al., Who Needs the IMF?,
THE WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1998.
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that would make it effective against programs like Indonesia's: a
MFN clause and a national treatment clause for investment.
FDI liberalization, after all, is the Agreement's raison d'etre, and
its focus on TRIMs is only a roundabout and, as has been
demonstrated, ineffective means of achieving that goal. A MFN
obligation for investment would have prevented Indonesia from
discriminating in favor of Korean capital and therefore favoring
a company, Kia, with which the Indonesian government was in
collusion. A national treatment obligation would have prevented
the Indonesian government from treating FDI less favorably
than domestic investment, ensuring that PT Timor Putra Na-
sional faced salutary competition. By containing neither provi-
sion, the TRIMs Agreement failed to prevent or provide a
remedy for the Indonesian debacle and will fail to do so should
any similar program arise elsewhere in the future. A new agree-
ment, focused on investment, is undoubtedly needed.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT
A. THE OECD AND THE MAI
Once it is acknowledged that the TRIMs Agreement has
failed, alternative arrangements can come to the fore of the de-
bate on investment liberalization. One such alternative that
shows great promise is the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development's 18' (OECD) proposed Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI).18 2 This proposal focuses directly on
FDI, eschewing the indirection of the TRIMs Agreement. More-
over, it includes the two provisions that the TRIMs Agreement
sorely lacks: a MFN obligation and a national treatment obliga-
tion for investment. Although the MAI, if approved, would bind
only the wealthy, developed nations that comprise the OECD, it
provides a blueprint for future arrangements that may eventu-
ally include the developing countries.' 8 3
181. For a brief history of the OECD, see Hart, supra note 59, at 59-61. The
OECD began as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC),
an organization of Western European countries which hoped to facilitate the
rebuilding of their economies after World War II. It became the OECD in 1961
when other developed countries (first the United States and Canada, then Ja-
pan, Australia, and New Zealand) were admitted. See id. at 59.
182. The OECD agreed in May 1995 to begin negotiations on the MAI. See
Schwanen, supra note 125, at 1.
183. The MAI is not the only possible blueprint for future investment ar-
rangements. Other possibilities include regional arrangements that permit
open-FDI or managed-FDI-for example, the European Union (EU), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Australia-New Zealand
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The MAI is still a work-in-progress, although at least one
draft has thus far been promulgated.184 In addition to MFN and
national treatment obligations, the MAI's main features include
explicit prohibitions on performance requirements and regula-
tions on investment incentives. As yet, however, there is no con-
sensus on what types of regulations would be permissible. 8
5
The MAI's MFN clause would expand the analogous GATT
provision, Article I, to FDI.' 8 6 As noted in the analysis of the
Indonesian controversy, the TRIMs Agreement is silent on dis-
crimination between home countries supplying FDI. Indonesia's
ability to discriminate enabled it to favor FDI from Korea as a
means of furthering PT Timor Putra Nasional's shady joint ven-
ture with Kia Motors. By providing the joint venture with an
enormous tariff reduction and therefore a significant pricing ad-
vantage, the Indonesian government effectively locked out FDI
from other auto-producing nations such as the United States
and Japan. While this, of course, was the government's goal, In-
donesia's recent economic crisis demonstrates the folly of such
policies.
The MAI's national treatment obligation essentially extrap-
olates GATT Article III from goods to investments. 8 7 GATT Ar-
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. See Hart, supra note 59, at 66-69;
see generally Atik, supra note 4 (discussing current open-FDI and managed-FDI
arrangements). These arrangements all have the advantage over the TRIMs
Agreement in that they actually advance investment liberalization, even
though they are necessarily confined geographically (the MAI to the wealthy,
developed nations of the OECD, the EU and NAFTA to their repective regions).
The theory, discussed infra, is that investment liberalization should advance
first, then spread beyond certain geographical pockets. In contrast, the TRIMs
Agreement is diffuse geographically but shallow to the point of uselessness for
investment liberalization.
184. See The MAI Negotiating Text (visited Oct.12,1998) <http:ll
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI].
185. Some OECD members felt that investment incentives were adequately
covered by other articles in the MAI. See id.
186. Article III:.2 of the MAI reads:
Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Con-
tracting Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable
than the treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to investors of
any other Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, and to the
investments of investors of any other Contracting Party or of a non-
Contracting Party, with respect to the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and
sale or other disposition of investments.
Id. art. 111:1.2.
187. Article III:1.1 of the MAI reads:
Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Con-
tracting Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable
than the treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to its own inves-
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ticle III prohibits discrimination within a country between
domestic and foreign like products; the MAI Article 111: 1.1 would
prohibit internal discrimination between domestic and foreign
investors and investments. This provision would prevent the
type of equity requirements Indonesia imposed in its national
car program. It would force domestic enterprises to compete on
equal terms with foreign-owned and operated businesses that
occupy the same economic sector, weeding out inefficient produ-
cers such as PT Timor Putra Nasional. As in the trade arena, a
national treatment obligation is essential to investment, since
internal restrictions on FDI would undermine the benefits of ac-
cess guaranteed by the MFN obligation. 188 As in the Indonesian
case, internal restrictions on FDI would inhibit FDI inflows.' 8 9
By enumerating specific prohibited measures, the MAI's Ar-
ticle XX is similar in form to the TRIMs Agreement's "Illustra-
tive List."1 90 Yet it unequivocally proscribes performance
requirements, including the type of trade-balancing regulation
Brazil imposed in its auto regime. It prohibits any requirement
that relates "in any way the volume or value of imports to the
volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange
inflows associated with such investment."191
The MAI has one more feature which the TRIMs Agreement
lacks and which makes it a more effective proposal for invest-
tors and their investments with respect to the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, operation, management, maintenance; [sic] use,
enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments.
Id. art. III:l.1.
188. See Atik, supra note 4, at 10.
189. See id. at 11.
190. Article III of the MAI reads:
No Contracting Party may impose, enforce or maintain any of the fol-
lowing requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in
connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, operation, or conduct of an investment of an investor of a Con-
tracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party in its territory:
(a) to export a given level of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services
from persons in its territory;
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the vol-
ume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange in-
flows associated with such investment;
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such
investment produces or provides by relating such sales in any way
to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings.
MAI, supra note 184, art. III.
191. Id. art. III(d).
1999]
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
ment liberalization: a forward-looking approach. As noted previ-
ously, the TRIMs Agreement is inherently backward-looking; it
confines itself to trade in goods only and does no more than reca-
pitulate GATT provisions. As such, it supplies neither a progres-
sive vision nor an implicit or explicit proposal for greater
investment liberalization. The MAI, on the other hand, frees it-
self from trade in goods and focuses directly on FDI. Even
though it would only apply to developed OECD-member nations,
the MAI has greater potential than the TRIMs Agreement,
which binds both developed and developing GATT signatories.
The MAI moves forward toward investment liberalization and, if
successful, will be able to spread to other nations, particularly if
the competition for FDI continues to increase, as is likely. As one
scholar has observed, the MAI has "no point" if it does not intend
ultimately to advance investment liberalization throughout the
international community. 192 This indeed is the MAI's point, and
it is an achievable one. It is a point that the TRIMs Agreement
fails to comprehend.
IV. CONCLUSION
The TRIMs Agreement began as a legitimate attempt to
move toward global investment liberalization. It sought to pro-
scribe investment measures which adversely affect trade in
goods, thereby removing one constraint upon the free flow of
FDI. Yet the Agreement which emerged after a long negotiating
history fell short of its goal. The recent automobile controversies
in Brazil and Indonesia have exposed the TRIMs Agreement's
inadequacy-specifically, its failure to push beyond GATT to-
ward a comprehensive agreement focused on FDI.
In the new international economy, FDI has become increas-
ingly important to both developed and developing nations, and
an effective agreement is necessary to loosen constraints upon it.
The OECD's proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment
shows great promise as a model for future investment arrange-
ments. While confined to the developed nations of the OECD,
the MAI, if approved and if successful, may become the progeni-
tor of a global agreement that will achieve what the TRIMs
Agreement has not: effective investment liberalization.
192. See Startup, supra note 79, at 191. Startup also believes that non-
OECD members should be "engaged"-that is, apprised and consulted-as the
MAI and other investment liberalization measures proceed. Id.
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